We define and analyze a simple and fully parallelizable block-cipher mode of operation for message authentication. Parallelizability does not come at the expense of serial efficiency: in a conventional, serial environment, the algorithm's speed is within a few percent of the (inherently sequential) CBC MAC. The new mode, PMAC, is deterministic, resembles a standard mode of operation (and not a Carter-Wegman MAC), works for strings of any bit length, employs a single block-cipher key, and uses just max{1, ⌈|M |/n⌉} block-cipher calls to MAC a string M ∈ {0, 1} * using an n-bit cipher. We prove PMAC secure, quantifying an adversary's forgery probability in terms of the quality of the block cipher as a pseudorandom permutation.
Introduction
Background. Popular message authentication codes (MACs), like the CBC MAC [15] and HMAC [1] , are inherently sequential: one cannot process the i-th message block until all previous message blocks have been processed. This serial bottleneck is becoming increasingly an issue. Commodity processors are offering up more and more parallelism, so that not only block ciphers, but also their usage modes benefit from having good parallelizability characteristics. The increase in speed of networks has continued to outpace the increase in speed of cryptographic hardware, so that high-speed networks now operate at much higher speeds than one can compute the CBC MAC or HMAC. Groups like the IP Storage (ips) working group of the IETF have expressed a need for a faster MAC. By now there would seem to be a significant interest in having a parallelizable MAC which performs well in hardware or software, built from a block cipher like the AES.
There are several approaches to the design of such an MAC. One is to generically construct a more parallelizable MAC from an arbitrary one. For example, one could, as a starting point, break the message
and separately MAC each halve. But such an approach requires one to anticipate the maximal amount of parallelism that one aims to extract. In the current work we are instead interested in fully parallelizable MACs-the amount of parallelism that can be extracted is not limited by the structure of the algorithm.
One idea for making a fully parallelizable MAC is to use the Carter-Wegman paradigm [10, 11, 21] , as in [14, 17] , making sure to select a universal hash-function family that is fully parallelizable. In fact, most universal hash functions that have been suggested are fully parallelizable. This approach is elegant and can lead to a nice MAC. But constructions for fast universal hash-functions have proven to be quite complex to specify or to implement well [7, 9] , and seem strongly biased either towards hardware or towards software. Now twenty years after the paradigm was introduced, we still do not know of a single Carter-Wegman MAC that actually gets used. So the current work goes back to giving a conventional mode-a block-cipher mode of operation designed, this time around, for serial and parallel efficiency.
The XOR MAC. Bellare, Guérin and Rogaway introduced a parallelizable MAC mode of operation in their XOR MACs [3] . The message M is divided into pieces M [1] · · · M [ℓ] of length less than the blocksize; for concreteness, think of each M [i] as having 64 bits when the blocksize is n = 128 bits. Each piece M [i] is preceded by [i] , the number i encoded as a 64-bit number, and to each [i] M [i] one applies the block cipher E, keyed by the MAC key K. One more block is enciphered, it having a first bit of 1 and then a counter or random value in the remaining n − 1 bits. The MAC is that counter or random value together with the XOR of all ℓ + 1 ciphertext blocks.
The XOR MAC requires ℓ + 1 ≈ 2m + 1 block-cipher invocations to authenticate a message of m blocks, each block having n-bits. Thus one has paid for parallelizability at a cost of about a factor of two in serial speed. One also pays in the need for randomness or state (conventional MACs are deterministic) and one pays in the length of the MAC (which it now longer because of the counter or random value that has to be included).
The new MAC. Unlike the XOR MAC, the new MAC, PMAC, doesn't waste any block-cipher invocations because of block-indices, and counters/random values. Also, in the spirit of [8] , we are careful to optimally deal with short final blocks. We correctly MAC messages of arbitrary and varying bit lengths. The result is that MAC makes do with just ⌈|M |/n⌉ block-cipher calls to MAC a non-empty message M . The new mode is deterministic, freeing the user from having to provide a counter or random value, and making the MAC shorter. Overhead beyond the block-cipher calls has been aggressively optimized, so that a serial implementation of PMAC runs just a few percent slower than the CBC MAC. The MAC is shown in Figures 1 and 2 .
Besides the efficiency measures already mentioned, PMAC uses very little key-setup: one blockcipher call (plus a few shifts and conditional xors are useful). The underlying key is a single key for the underlying blocks cipher. In particular, we forgo the usual key-separation technique. Avoiding multiple keys saves time because many block ciphers have significant key-setup costs.
Being so stingy with keys and block-cipher invocations takes significant care; note that even the traditional CBC MAC uses between 1 and 4 additional block-cipher calls (as well as additional key material) once it it has been appropriately enriched to take care of messages of arbitrary lengths [6, 8, 15, 19] . Of course avoiding this overhead doesn't matter much on long messages, but it is significant on short ones (and, in many environments, short messages are common).
We prove PMAC secure, in the sense of reduction-based cryptography. Specifically, we prove that PMAC approximates a random function (and is therefore a good MAC) as long as the underlying block cipher approximates a random permutation. The actual results are quantitative; the security analysis is in the concrete-security paradigm.
Additional related work. Building on [3] , Gligor and Donescu describe a MAC they call the XECB MAC [12] . This MAC is not deterministic, it uses more block-cipher invocations, and it was not designed for messages of arbitrary bit length. But, like PMAC, it goes beyond the XOR MAC by combining a message index and a message block in a way other than encoding the two. In particular, [12] combines i and M [i] by adding to M [i], modulo 2 n , a secret multiple i. We combines i and M [i] by different means, to reduce overhead and obtain a better bound.
PMAC was also influenced by the variant of the XOR MAC due to Bernstein [7] . His algorithm is deterministic, and the way that the XOR MAC was made deterministic in [7] is similar to the way that PMAC has been made deterministic. Finally, there is also some similarity in appearance between PMAC and Jutla's IAPM encryption mode [16] .
Mathematical Preliminaries
Notation. If i ≥ 1 is an integer then ntz(i) is the number of trailing 0-bits in the binary representation of i. So, for example, ntz(7) = 0 and ntz(8) = 3. If A ∈ {0, 1} * is a string then |A| denotes its length in bits while A n = max{1, ⌈|A|/n⌉} denotes its length in n-bit blocks (where the empty string counts as one block). If A = a n−1 · · · a 1 a 0 ∈ {0, 1} n is a string (each a i ∈ {0, 1}) then str2num(A) is the number
is the n-bit string A such that str2num(A) = a. Let len n (A) = num2str n (|A|). We omit the subscript when n is understood. If A, B ∈ {0, 1} * are equal-length strings than A ⊕ B is their bitwise xor. If A ∈ {0, 1} * and |A| < n then pad n (A) is the string A 10 n−|A|−1 . If A ∈ {0, 1} n then pad n (A) = A. With n understood we write pad(A) for pad n (A). If A = a n−1 a n−2 · · · a 1 a 0 ∈ {0, 1} n then A< <1 = a n−2 a n−3 · · · a 1 a 0 0 is the n-bit string which is a left shift of A by 1 bit while A> >1 = 0a n−1 a n−2 . . . a 2 a 1 is the n-bit string which is a right shift of A by one bit. In pseudocode we write "
The field with 2 n points. The field with 2 n points is denoted GF(2 n ). We interchangeably think of a point a in GF(2 n ) in any of the following ways: (1) as an abstract point in a field; (2) as an n-bit string a n−1 . . . a 1 a 0 ∈ {0, 1} n ; (3) as a formal polynomial a(x) = a n−1 x n−1 +· · ·+a 1 x+a 0 with binary coefficients; (4) as a nonnegative integer between 0 and 2 n − 1, where the string a ∈ {0, 1} n corresponds to the number str2num(a). We write a(x) instead of a if we wish to emphasize that we are thinking of a as a polynomial. To add two points in GF(2 n ), take their bitwise xor. We denote this operation by a ⊕ b. To multiply two points, fix some irreducible polynomial p(x) having binary coefficients and degree n. To be concrete, choose the lexicographically first polynomial among the irreducible degree n polynomials having a minimum number of coefficients. To multiply points a, b ∈ GF(2 n ), which we denote a · b, regard a and b as polynomials a(x) = a n−1 x n−1 + · · · + a 1 x + a 0 and b(x) = b n−1 x n−1 + · · · + b 1 x + b 0 , form their product c(x) where one adds and multiplies coefficients in GF(2), and take the remainder when dividing c(x) by p(x). Note that it is particularly easy to multiply a point a ∈ {0, 1} n by x. We illustrate the method for n = 128, where p(x) = x 128 + x 7 + x 2 + x + 1. Then multiplying a = a n−1 · · · a 1 a 0 by x yields
It is similarly easy to divide a by x (meaning to multiply a by the multiplicative inverse of x). To illustrate, assume that n = 128. Then
We point out that huge = x −1 will be an enormous number (when viewed as a number); in particular, huge starts with a 1 bit, so huge > 2 n−1 . In the security proof this fact is relevant, so there we use huge as a synonym for x −1 when this seems to add to clarity. Figure 1 : Definition of PMAC. The message to MAC is M and the key is K. The algorithm depends on a block cipher E : K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and a number τ ∈ [1..n]. Constants γ 1 , γ 2 , . . ., the meaning of the multiplication operator, and the meaning of pad() are all defined in the text.
Gray codes.
For ℓ ≥ 1, a Gray code is an ordering
ℓ such that successive points differ (in the Hamming sense) by just one bit. For n a fixed number, PMAC makes use of the "canonical" Gray code γ = γ n constructed by γ 1 = 0 1 while, for ℓ > 0,
It is easy to see that γ is a Gray code. What is more, for
. This makes it easy to compute successive points. We note that γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ 2 n −1 are distinct, different from 0, and
Let L ∈ {0, 1} n and consider the problem of successively forming the strings
. is obtained by xoring the previous word with L(ntz(i)).

Definition of PMAC
PMAC depends on two parameters: a block cipher and a tag length. The block cipher is a function E : K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , for some number n, where each
n . Here K is the set of possible keys and n is the block length. The tag length is an integer τ ∈ [1..n]. By trivial means the adversary will be able to forge a valid ciphertext with probability 2 −τ . With E : K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and τ ∈ [1.
.n], we let PMAC[E, τ ] denote PMAC using block cipher E and tag length τ . This is a function from a key K ∈ K and a message M ∈ {0, 1} * to a string in {0, 1} τ . It is defined in Figure 1 and illustrated in Figure 2 . The following alternative description of PMAC may help to clarify what a typical implementation might choose to do. Key generation: Choose a random key K R ← K for the block cipher. The key K is provided to both the party that generates MACs and the party that verifies them. Key setup: Both the party that generates the MACs and the party that verifies the MACs do any key setup useful for applying the block-cipher in its forward direction. Let L ← E K (0 n ). Let m * bound the maximum number of n-bit blocks for any message which will be MACed. ? ?
first τ bits
. Return Tag as the computed MAC. MAC verification: Given (M, Tag ′ ), do the following: Generate the MAC Tag for the message M using the MAC generation procedure just described. If Tag = Tag ′ then regard the message M as authentic. If Tag = Tag ′ then regard the message M as inauthentic.
Comments
As we shall see, PMAC is more than a MAC: it is a variable-length input, fixed-length output pseudorandom function (PRF). As long as the underlying block cipher E is secure, an adversary will be unable to distinguish PMAC K (·), for a random but hidden key K, from a random function ρ from {0, 1} * to {0, 1} τ . It is a well-known observation, dating to the introduction of PRFs [13] , that a pseudorandom function is necessarily a good MAC.
Conceptually, the key is (K, L). But instead of regarding this as the key, and instead of defining K and L from an underlying key using standard key-separation techniques, L is defined from key K and then K is still used. Normally such "lazy key-derivation" would get one into serious trouble, in proofs if nothing else. For PMAC we prove that this form of lazy key-derivation works fine.
Any string M ∈ {0, 1} * can be MACed, and messages which are not a multiple of the block length are handled without the need for obligatory padding, which would increase the number of block-cipher calls. MAC generation is "on line," meaning that one does not need to know the length of the message M in advance. Instead, the message can be MACed as one goes along, continuing until there is an indication that the message is now complete. The work of Petrank and Rackoff has helped bring out the importance of this property [19] .
In contrast to a scheme based on mod p arithmetic (for a prime p) or based on mod 2 n arithmetic, there is almost no endian-favoritism implicit in the definition of PMAC. (The exception is that the one left shift used for forming L(i + 1) from L(i) is more convenient under a big-endian convention, as is the one right shift used for forming
Assuming that τ = n (or that one retains a constant amount of extra information), PMAC is incremental, in the sense of [13] , with respect to three common operations for updating message PMAC is parsimonious, in the sense of [5] .
, and Tag = PMAC K (M ). As shown in [5] , a parsimonious PRF can be combined with a parsimonious encryption scheme to yield a length-preserving pseudorandom permutation (that is, a "variable-input-length block cipher") that acts on messages of any number of bits ℓ greater than or equal to n. In particular, by combining CTR-mode encryption and PMAC one gets a fully parallelizable length-preserving PRP.
Theorems
Security definitions. We first recall the needed definitions, which are standard. A block cipher is a function E : K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n where K is a finite set of strings and each
n . Let Perm(n) denote the set of all permutations on {0, 1} n . This set can be regarded as a block cipher by imagining that each permutation is named by a unique string. Let A be an adversary (a probabilistic algorithm) with access to an oracle, and suppose that A always outputs a bit. Define
The above is the probability that adversary A outputs 1 when given an oracle for E K (·), minus the probability that A outputs 1 when given an oracle for π(·), where K is selected at random from K and π is selected at random from Perm(n). A function family from n-bits to n-bits is a map F : K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n where K is a finite set of strings. We write F K (·) for F (K, ·). Let Rand(n) denote the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1}
n . This set can be regarded as a function family by imagining that each function in Rand(n) is named by a unique string. Define
* to {0, 1} τ . This set is given a probability measure by asserting that a random element ρ of Rand( * , τ ) associates to each string x ∈ {0, 1} * a random string ρ(x) ∈ {0, 1} τ . Define
Theorem statements. We now give an information-theoretic bound on the security of PMAC.
Theorem 1 [Security of PMAC; information-theoretic case] Fix PMAC parameters n and τ . Let A be an adversary with an oracle. Suppose that A asks its oracleueries, these queries having aggregate length of σ blocks. Letσ = σ + 1. Then
In the theorem statement, and from now on, the aggregate length of messages M 1 , . . . , M q asked by A of its oracle is the number σ = q r=1 M r n . From the theorem above it is standard to pass to a complexity-theoretic analog. One gets the following. Fix PMAC parameters n and τ , and a block cipher E : K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . Let A be an adversary with an oracle, and suppose that A asks queries with aggregate length of σ blocks. Letσ = σ + 1. Then there is an adversary B for attacking block cipher E that achieves advantage Adv
Adversary B asks at mostσ oracle queries and has a running time equal to A's running time plus the time to compute E onσ points, plus additional time which is cnσ, where the constant c depends only on details of the model of computation.
It is a standard result that being secure in the sense of a PRF implies an inability to forge with good probability. See [4, 13] .
Structure of the proof. The proof of Theorem 1 combines two lemmas. The first lemma, the structure lemma, measures the pseudorandomness of PMAC in terms of two other functions: the M-collision probability, denoted Mcoll n (·), and the MM-collision probability, denoted MMcoll n (·, ·). The second lemma, the collision-bounding lemma, upperbounds Mcoll n (m) and MMcoll n (m,m).
We begin by defining Mcoll n (·) and MMcoll n (·, ·). We can now state the structure lemma. The structure lemma provides a simple recipe for measuring the maximal advantage of an adversary who attacks the pseudorandomness of PMAC: namely, bound the collision probabilities Mcoll n (·) and MMcoll n (·, ·) and then use the formula. The lemma simplifies the analysis of PMAC in two ways. First, it allows one to excise adaptivity as a concern. Dealing with adaptivity is a major complicating factor in proofs of this type. Second, it allows one to concentrate on what happens to single messages and to a fixed pair of messages. It is easier to think about what happens with one or two messages than what is happening with all q of them.
Bounding the collision probabilities. The following lemma indicates that the two types of collisions we have defined rarely occur. The proof shall be given shortly.
Lemma 2 [Collision-bounding lemma] Let
Mcoll n (·) and MMcoll n (·, ·) denote the M-collision probability and the MM-collision probability. Then 
We first show that for any two points
the probability that these two points collide is at most 2 −n . The inequality
Afterwards, we show that for any point
, the probability that they collide is at most 2 −n . The inequality
2 n we consider the following four cases:
We have used that γ i is nonzero and we are working in a field. (We will continue to use this without mention.) 
(Here one assumes that j < 2 n because the lemma gives a non-result anyway if j were larger.)
Assume that m ≥ 2, for otherwise there is nothing to show. Suppose first
The value Σ is uniformly random and independent of L, so this probability is 2 −n . Suppose next that
This value is 2 −n since γ i = huge. Here we are assuming that i < 2 n−1 , which is without loss of generality since a larger value of i, and therefore m, would give a non-result in the theorem statement.
Similarly, to show that MMcoll n (m,m) ≤ mm 2 n we verify the following four cases:
If i = j then γ i = γ j and this probability is 2 −n . If i = j then the probability is 0 since, necessarily, Figure 4 : Performance results. Numbers are in cycles per byte, on a Pentium 3, for three message lengths, the code written in assembly. The underlying block cipher is AES128. CBC MAC refers to the "basic" CBC MAC-no padding is performed and nothing extra is done to get security across messages of varying lengths. This makes the comparison conservative.
Performance
A colleague implemented PMAC using AES128 as the underlying block cipher. He compared PMAC's performance in an entirely sequential setting to that of CBCMAC-AES128. By CBCMAC we mean the "basic" CBC MAC-nothing is done to take care of length-variability or the possibility of strings which are not a multiple of the block length. This makes the comparisons conservative.
The code was written in modestly-optimized assembly. The operating system was Windows 2000 sp1 and the compiler was Visual C++ 6.0 sp4. All data fit into L1 cache. Disregarding the oneblock message in Figure 6 , we see that, in a serial environment, PMAC-AES128 was about 8% more expensive than the basic CBCMAC-AES128. A more aggressively optimized implementation of CBCMAC-AES128, due to Helger Lipmaa, achieves 15.5 cpb for 1 KByte message lengths [18] .
Adding the same 8%, we expect that this code could be modified to compute PMAC at a rate of about 16.7 cpb. In general, differences in implementation quality would seem to be a more significant a factor in determining implementation speed than the algorithmic difference between PMAC and the CBC MAC. If one repeats the comparison for an optimized C implementation, the measured overhead will appear to decrease (it will be less than 8%) since AES benefits a great deal from hand-optimized assembly, but the overhead associated to the CBC MAC and to PMAC are little changed.
We emphasize that the above is for an entirely serial execution environment with a limited number of registers. In an environment with plenty of registers and multiple instruction pipes, PMAC, properly implemented, will of course be faster than the CBC MAC.
Though some or all of the needed L(i)-values are likely to be pre-computed, calculating all of these values "on the fly" is not expensive. Starting with 0 n we form successive offsets by xoring the previous offset with
, and so forth. So half the time we use L itself; a quarter of the time we use 2 · L; one eighth of the time we use 4 · L; and so forth. Thus the expected number of a · x-operations to compute an offset is at most ∞ i=1 i/2 i+1 = 1. For n = 128, each a · x instruction requires an n-bit shift and a conditional 32-bit xor.
return Tag r [ 
A Proof of the Structure Lemma
Let A be an adversary that attacks PMAC[Perm(n), τ ]. Since A is computationally unbounded, there is no loss of generality to assume that A is deterministic. One can imagine A interacting with a PMAC[Perm(n), τ ] oracle as A playing a certain game, Game 1, as defined in Figure 5 . This game perfectly simulates the behavior of PMAC[Perm(n), τ ]. It does so in a somewhat unusual way, sometimes setting a flag bad to true. We observe that if the flag bad is not set to true in an execution of the game, then the value Tag r returned by the game at line 33 is a random one-the first τ bits of the string randomly selected at line 29. It follows that Adv PMAC[Perm(n),τ ] (A) is at most the probability that bad gets set to true in Game 1. The rest of the proof is devoted to bounding this probability.
return Tag r We first consider the probability that bad gets set to true in line 24 or 30. In both cases, we have just chosen a random n-bit string and then we are testing it for membership in a set. The size of this set starts at 1 (after executing line 10) and grows one element at a time until, by the time just before the last addition of a point, it has size σ. Thus we have that 
Here the subscript of 1 in the probability reminds us that we are considering the behavior of Game 1.
We can now modify Game 1 by changing the behavior when and only when bad is set, and adding as a compensating factor the bound given by Equation (4) . In particular, we may simply omit lines 24 and 30, and the second statement in the compound statement of line 28 along with the following else. The modified game is rewritten in Figure 6 . At this point we know that
Here the subscript of 2 in the probability reminds us that we are considering the behavior of Game 2. Notice in Game 2 that the value Tag r returned in response to a query M is always a random τ -bit string. But of course the game does more than just return these strings: it also chooses L at random, fills in π-values, and sets bad under certain conditions. We can defer doing all those things, and just return the random strings Tag 1 , . . . , Tag q . This does not change the view of the adversary that interacts with the game, nor will it change the probability that bad is set to true. The modified game is called Game 3, and it is depicted in Figure 7 .
We need to bound the probability that bad gets set to true in Game 3. This probability is over the random TAG r -values selected at line 10, the random value of L selected at line 20, and the random Y r [i]-values selected at line 25. We want to show that, over these random values, When A makes its r-th query, Figure 7 : Game 3. Like Game 2, but we defer all but the selection of TAG r -values. This does not change the view of the adversary or the chance that bad will be set to true.
for r ← 1 to q do . This game depends on constants C which specify: q, TAG 1 , . . . , TAG q ∈ {0, 1} n , and
bad will rarely be set. In fact, we show something stronger: that even if one arbitrarily fixes the values of TAG 1 , . . . , TAG q ∈ {0, 1} n (and takes the probability over just the remaining values), still the probability that bad will be set to true is small. Since the oracle responses have now been fixed, and since the adversary itself is deterministic, the queries M 1 , . . . , M q that the adversary will generate have likewise been fixed. Interaction and the adversary itself are essentially gone at this point, replaced by universal quantification. The new game is show in Figure 8 . It depends on constants C = (q, TAG 1 , . . . , TAG q , M 1 , . . . , M q ). At this point in the proof we have that 
where, if A is limited toueries of aggregate length σ, then C specifies q, strings M 1 , . . . , M q of aggregate block length σ, and TAG 1 , . . . , TAG q ∈ {0, 1} n . The next step is to modify Game 4 so that the new game, Game 5, sets bad every time that Game 4 does, plus some additional times. Look at line 14 in Game 4. The value X r [i] could have 10 L R ← {0, 1}
n ; π(0 n is already in the domain of π and it is not due to the trivial cause (which is tested for in line 14). We also modify the last line, setting X r [m r ] to some particular value, say 0 n , instead of to TAG r . The only significance of this assignment was to make π defined at the point X r [m r ]; the particular value associated to this point is not used unless bad has already been set to true. In the first case, if we had run game 5 using coins L and Y s , dropping line 14 and restricting the execution of line 12 to r = s, then bad still would have been set to true. This exactly coincides with the game that defines Mcoll n (M s ). Thus the probability that case 1 occurs for M s , is at most Mcoll n (M s ), and, by the sum bound, the probability that case 1 occurs is at most 1≤r≤q Mcoll n (m r ).
In the second case, if we had run game 5 using coins L, Y s and Y u , restricting the execution of line 12 to r ∈ {s, u}, then bad still would have been set to true. This exactly coincides with the game that defines Mcoll n (M s , M u ). Thus the probability that case 2 occurs for M s , M u , is at most MMcoll n (M s , M u ), and the probability that case 2 occurs due to (M s , M u ) is at most MMcoll n (M s , M u ) and, by the sum bound, the probability of an MM collision is at most 1≤s<u≤q MMcoll n (m s , m u ). This completes the proof.
